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MISSISSIPPI v. JOHNSON, 4 WALLACE, 475.
HE Reconstruction Acts of March 2d and March 23d,

1867, directea what was in effect a subversion of the
governments of the late rebel states. The state of
Mississippi asked leave of the Supreme Court to file a bill in
that court, praying that court to enjoin Andrew Johnson, the
President, and General Ord, commanding in the District of
Mississippi and Arkansas, from in any manner carrying out
these acts of Congress. The Attorney General objected to
granting leave because the bill sought to enjoin the President
from the performance of his duties as such. The court confining itself to this question, came to the conclusion to refuse leave
to file the bill.
1. The President is required by the Acts to perform-not a
mefe ministerial, but an executive duty. A ministerial duty,
says Chase, C. J., for the moment adopting the r6le of lexicographer, is one in which nothing is left to discretion. "It is
a simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitted or
proved to exist, and imposed by law." But the Reconstruction
Acts require the President to do many acts respecting the mode
of doing which he has a discretion. He must assign generals
to the several districts. He has a choice as to whom to send to
this, whom to that district. This duty is in no sense ministerial.
The appositeness of this observation would be clearer if the
bill had sought to compel the President to appoint General A,
dr General B to the District. It did not do this. It asked the
edurt id fdrbid the appointment of anybody; on the ground
57
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that, as the statutes were unconstitutional and therefore not
laws, the President would derive no warrant from them to act
at all. If they were unconstitutional, they were, the courts
have taught us to say, void. What then would have been the
position of Andrew Johnson, had the Acts not been enacted?
Would he have had a legal discretion whether to send a general
into a state in order to subvert its government? Since the
power of the President is conferred by statute, if there is no
statute, there is no power. How then can it be said that he has
a duty which is executive in character? The duty springs from
a statute. There is no statute. Then there is no duty.
Chief Justice Chase wilfully blinks the distinction which is
patent to the obtusest, between the case in which the President
or other officer has received a power whose exercise requires
his discretion, and the case in which he has not received it, and
in which therefore, he has no legal option except to do nothing.
There being no act of Congress, authorizing the subversion of
the state of Mississippi, the President had one duty only, viz.,
not to subvert it. This was "a simple definite duty, arising
under conditions admitted, or proved to exist, and imposed by
law"; a "ministerial" duty therefore; or at least, a duty involving no discretion. Yet, palpable as this is, the Chief Justice
pretends not to perceive it. "We are unable to perceive" he
says, "that this circumstance [viz. that the bill seeks to restrain
action not warranted by law, because the so-called law was unconstitutional] takes the case out of the general principles
which forbid judicial interference with the exercise of executive
discretion." And this is all that he vouchsafes to say upon the
subject. When the discretion is conferred, if it exists, by law,
and there is no law [an unconstitutional law, the courts tell us,
is not a law] conferring it, it does not exist. To restrain the
doing of an act therefore, is not to restrain the exercise of a
lawful executive discretion.
It is to be observed that the point now made, is not that
the President is not to be restrained, but that no officer clothed
with discretion, is to be restrained. But the instances are too
numerous to mention here and now, in which executive officers
have been restrained from acting under unconstitutional law,
though, if the law were unconstitutional, they would have had
an executive discretion. If a marshall, or a collector of the
ports, cannot be allowed to execute an unconstitutional law be-
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cause it confers no discretion upon him, it is. impossible to see
why a superior executive officer under the same circumstances
should not be restrained. The Court's first objection therefore,
is wholly without substance.
2. The next objection of the Court is one that appeals to the
reader's sense of the ludicrous. The bill is without precedent.
"Had it been supposed," says the Court, "at the bar that this
court would, in any case interpose by injunction, to prevent the
execution of an unconstitutional act of Congress, it can hardly be
doubted that applications with that object would have been
He says that occasions have not
heretofore addressed to us."
been wanting. He finds one. The admission of Texas was
thought by many unconstitutional, but nobody asked that the
President be enjoined from executing the statute. "The fact
that no such application was ever made before, indicates the
general judgment of the profession that no such application
should be entertained."
Nobody filed a bill to prevent the annexation of Texas,
therefore, if any body files a bill to restrain the President from
executing an unconstitutional statute, he asks the court to do
what it may not properly do! A singular way of deciding legal
questions truly. In a very few cases [only one is unearthed]
nobody filed a bill. But that might be because nobody was
sufficiently interested. It costs money to file a bill. Every
body's business is nobody's business. Who were the unknown
attorneys who expressed a judgment against the feasibility of
filing a bill, by refraining from filing it? Attorneys do not file
bills gratuitously. Who were the citizens who would have paid
big fees, had they not concluded that the bill would not lie?
3. The third argument is quite remarkable. The court
cannot restrain the enactment of an unconstitutional law.
Therefore, it cannot restrain the execution of it by the President! So prevention of the execution of a law by the president
cannot be distinguished in principle from the prevention of the
enactment of the law!
But is it true that prevention of execution is not attempted
by the courts? In Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court
refused itself, to entertain a suit; that is, refused to execute a
statute, because it thought the statute unconstitutional. The
cases are many, in which executive officers, tax collectors and
others, have been forbidden by the courts to carry out a particu-
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lar law. Cases are also many in which damages have been recovered from officers who have executed unconstitutional statutes. It is quite clear that when one who carries out a law is
subject to damages, he is deterred from carrying it out. -When
he is forbidden by injunction from carrying it out, he knows
that a violation of the injunction will be followed by fine or imprisonment or both. The anticipation of these results, like the
anticipation of the imposition of damages, deters from the execution of the act. The assertion then, that the courts will not impede execution of statutes, if unconstitutional, is flagrantly untrue. Unless they did so, the whole power of nullifying statutes
would fall to the g-round, for to nullify, is for the court itself to
refuse to carry them out, and to affright others, official or nonofficial persons, from carrying them out, whether by injunction
before execution, or by suits for damages after execution.
The premise of this part of the argument of the Chief Justice is, that the enactment of a law, though it would be unconstitutional, will not be restrained. "It will hardly be contended
that the court can interfere in any case, to restrain the enactment of an unconstitutional law."
And why not? In Europe it
would not only not be contended that a court could nullify the law
promulgated by the highest legislative body, but the assumption of such a power is repudiated. It was reserved for the
Supreme Court of the United States to arrogate to itself this
power. But, the power once assumed, it is a mere matter of
detail how it shall be exercised. The act may be annulled after
enactment, by prohibiting the executive officers to carry it out,
or by mulcting them in damages, if they cakry it out. But since
it is useless to pass a law, if it is not going to be carried out,
it would manifestly be better that the law should not be passed.
Such a law perplexes people. They do not know whether it is
going to be held valid or not. If they obey they run a risk.
They run a risk if they disobey. Business is embarrassed.
Rights are jeoparded. The scientific method, if the courts may
annul laws, is for them tp prohibit their enactment. The only
objection to this method, is stated by Chase, C. J., thus: Congress is the legislative department; the President is the Executive department. Neither can be restrained in its action by
the Judicial department."
He naively adds "though the acts
of both, when performed, are, in proper cases, subject to its
cognizance," by which he means-, that those who carry out the
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law may be penalized or subjected to damages. He might have
added, that those who are about to carry out the law may be
prevented by the courts from doing so.
But, what is the use of a law that if passed must not be
obeyed? What right has a legislature to pass a law of which
another arm of the government is going to prevent the execution? Is it not simpler, directer, for the courts that step between a statute and its enforcement, to notify the legislative
body, in advance, that, since it will be void, if passed, it shall
not be passed at all? The courts affect to think that the subordination of the legislature to them is less real and manifest
when they allow the latter to enact a law, although they instantly interpose by injunction or otherwise to prevent the enforcement of it, than it would be, if they directed the injunction
to the legislators themselves, and forbad the passage of the unconstitutional law, a mode of envisaging the question which
only purblind thinkers could be induced to adopt.
The legislature exists to will certain effects, to be wrought
out by its executive agents. This will is foiled, as much by
preventing the fulfilment of it, when expressed, as by preventing the expression of it in the form of a statute, and the subordination of the legislature to the courts is as effectually accomplished when its agents are forbidden to obey the command as
it would be were it forbidden to issue the command.
In New Orleans Water-works Co. v. New Orleans, 164 U.
S. 471, an application to the court to prevent the councils of New
Orleans from passing ordinances which were unconstitutional,
that is, which impaired the obligation of a contract, was declined,
although the court had on two occasions enjoined acts in execution of a similar ordinance. To the argument for an injunction
against the passage of such ordinances, that it would tend
to protect the plaintiff in its rights, Harlan, J., said: "Our
answer is that a court of equity cannot properly interfere with,
or restrain in advance, the discretion of a municipal body which
is in the exercise of powers that are legislative in their character."
He adds that the council acts by delegation from the
state legislature, and to restrain it is virtually to restrain the
legislature. "The passage of ordinances of such bodies are
[sic] legislative acts, which a court of equity will not enjoin."
But why? If the court will enjoin against the execution of the
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ordinance, why this squeamishness about enjoining against the
enactment itself ? The Justice discloses no reason.
There can be only one reason. To enjoin a legislature
would be to .court its defiance, its disobedience. The recalcitrants would be too numerous, too powerful, to make possible
their punishment for contempt, and their due subjection to the
court, but when the law or ordinance is once passed, and the legislature is dispersed, the prohibition of the enforcement of it will
arouse no such combined and deadly opposition. The legislature is actually as much subjected and subordinated, in the
latter case, as in the former, but the risk of its perceiving and
feeling and of its resenting its insubordination is very little, as
experience shows. Had the court boldly and candidly taken
the position that the legislature had no right, no competence, no
discretion to pass an unconstitutional law, and therefore, should
be forbidden to pass it, it would have been frank and fearless,
but it would almost certainly have provoked a denial of the
court's power to annul laws. A square issue would have been
raised between the keeper of the purse, and the judges, and the
judges would have been obliged to renouce the claim of right
to declare statutes void. A policy of stealth and disguise is
often necessary to the success of a contemplated usurpation.
Justice Harlan speaks of restraining in advance, "the discretion" of a legislative body. But, if a proposed law is unconstitutional, the body has no legal discretion to pass it. To
forbid its passing the law is only to repeat the prohibition of
the Constitution, and to add penalties for contempt of court,
which no power in the state imposes merely for contempt of the
Constitution, or of the people who enacted it.
The Chief Justice remarks that congress is the legislative
department; the President is the executive department. The
President is only an infinitesimal part of the executive department. Every post-master, collector of the ports, internal revenue collector, marshall, is a part of the executive. There are
few classes of acts which the President can do, physically, or
legally. The Chief Justice apparently, is getting ready to
abandon the principle that the execution of a law can no more
be prevented by the courts than the enactment of it, and is
about to leap to the principle that the President qua President,
is thus exempt from prohibition.
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But, such was not the view of a greater than Chase. In
Marbury v. Madison, Marshall, C. J., thought the propriety of
a mandamus was to be determined, not by the dignity of the
person commanded, but by the nature of the thing which he
was commanded to do. And surely, to forbid a great officer's
doing a thing can be no worse than to command him to do a
thing.
The Chief Justice thinks that the impropriety of issuing a
prohibition to the President, is clear. The President -may -efuse obedience. How then, can he be coerced? The court is
"without power to enforce its process." But, if the court has
under our system, the constitutional right to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional, and to forbid their execution, does not
the President know this? Is it not injurious to him to indulge
the supposition that he would disobey the courts? Should not
the courts assume that, they being his mentor with respect to
the validity of statutes, he would cheerfully acquiesce in their
decisions ? Is it only the strong, great men of the country who
are not to feel the constraining hand of the judges?
But the next suggestion of the Chief Justice is astonishing.
The President obeys the court, like a law-abiding man. But,
instead of respecting him for his obedience, "may not the House
of Representatives impeach the President for such refusal" to
carry out the law? But to suppose the House to impeach
him for obeying the order of the court, is to impute to the
House a most reprehensible spirit. Is it true that the Court is
the judge of constitutionality? And should the other departments acquiesce in the court's decision? Then, how injurious
is it to the House to suppose it lawless enough to desire to punish the President for being docile and legal.
The Chief Justice laments that the court cou.ld not help the
President, if he were impeached. "Would the strange spectacle be offered to the public wonder, of an attempt by this
court to arrest proceedings in that court?" [i. e. the -court of
impeachment, the Senate.] So the poor President would be
left bare and unfriended, before his enemies, and all because he
did not disobey the Court. So, to prevent this disaster, the
court will refrain from issuing commands to him. It will reserve its commands for those whose obedience to them will not
expose them to the horrors of impeachment!

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
The Chief Justice doubtless thought it discreet not to write
another far more urgent objection to the wholesale nullification
of the Reconstruction Acts, by forbidding the President to carry
them out. If the House was depraved enough to impeach the
President f6r obeying the order of the court, it might be depraved enough to impeach the court itself for issuing such an
order. "Would the strange spectacle be offered to the public
wonder of an attempt of this court to arrest proceedings in that
court [viz. their own impeachment]"? Would the court be
able to protect itself from the avenging Congress?
The tenuousness of the reasons assigned for refusing the
injunction justifies the belief that they were not the real reasons; that the real reason was the excitement and indignation
which would have been awakened in the country, at the wholesale nullification, by an order to the President, of the Reconstruction Acts, and the apprehension that the very existence of
the court would have been endangered.
This opinion of the Chief Justice must be ranked among
the most inept and foolish in the whole catena of decisions.
1
Dunning remarks, referring to recent decisions, in the same year,
of the Supreme Court, that were distasteful to Congress, "The congressional leaders, while obviously reluctant to attack the venerated judicial organ [the Supreme Court] did not conceal their purpose to do so,
if the provocation should go further." Reconstruction, p. 89.
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MOOT COURT
SIMPSON ESTATE.
Decedent's Estate-Construction of Act of April 8, 1833-What
is Signing a Will "at the End Thereof"?
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Matthew Simpson, intending to make a will of three paragraphs,
took a sheet of paper and dated it at the top of the page, then signed it
on the third line from the bottom. He then called in a friend who could
compose better than he, and telling his friend what his wishes were,
asked him to express his wishes distinctly and clearly. His friend wrote
three paragraphs, thus covering all the page above the signature and
embodying all the instructions of Simpson. On Simpson's death the will
was offered for probate and probate was refused. Appeal to Orphans'
Court.
Rickles for Plaintiff.
Evans for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
PEPPETS, J.-The act of April 8, 1833, provides that "Every will
shall be in writing and unless the person making the same shall be prevented by the extremity of his last sickness, shall be signed by him at
the end thereof", etc. The only and all important qnestion in this case
is, is this will signed "at the end thereof" as contemplated by the
statute? Does it mean the physical end or the end in point of time? In
Baker's Appeal, 107 Pa. 381, it was held that the end of a will within
the meaning of the act is not the physical end.
In order to learn the meaning of this peculiar provision in the present
statute of wills, it is necessary to compare it with the former act. Under
the Act of 1705, it was held that a will, in Pennsylvania, need not be seen
by the testator, or read to him, if it was put upon paper before his death.
The mischief of it was that, as it was unnecessary for the testator to
have adopted the instrument after it was finished, it followed that memoranda for the preparing of a will, dictated by a dying man, might be
admitted to probate. In this there was grave danger of imposition. To
correct this the statute of 1833 was passed requiring that the will be
signed "at the end thereof." The aim of the statute is to prevent a
fraud; to surround testamentary dispositions with such safeguards as
will protect them from alteration. Therefore, the legislature must have
intended the testator to examine the will and show his formal approval
by affixing his signature thereto. How can we say that the testator in
this case approved what is afterwards set up as his will, when there was
no will to approve? The intention of the testator is not to be considered
when construing a statute, but that of the legislature. TLe question is
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not, what did the testator intend to do, but, what has he done in the
,,
light of the statute.
Let us look at the English statute of wills, which is similar to ours,
and see how they have construed it. By the English statute of 7 Will.
IV, and 1 Vict. c. 26, it was thereby enacted that no will should be valid,
unless in writing, and executed as therein provided, and one of the requisites was that it should be signed, at the foot or end thereof by the testator, or by some other person in his presence and hy his direction.
These statutes were construed as meaning that the signature must-be
affixed at the end of the will, so as to leave no blank space for any interpolation between the end of the will and the signature. By the statute
15 and 16 Vict. c. 24, the legislature altered the law, but in this amendatory statute it is expressly provided that no signature shall be operative to give effect to any disposition or direction which is underneath or
which follows it, nor to any disposition or direction, inserted after the
signature shall be made.
An English case, In the Goods of Arthur, L. R., 2 P. & D. 273, holds
that if anything be added to the will after the signature of the testator
is made, although it be written above such signature and before the witness sign, it will not be considered that the will was signed and acknowledged as containing such clause, and probate of the will, will issue
without it. See Jarman on Wills, Vol. 1, Page 252, Note.
We are of opinion that the will is nut legally subscribed, and therefore, void. To hold otherwise would open the door to fraud. The will
was rightfully rejected and the appeal is hereby dismissed.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
"Every will," says the 6th paragraph of the act of April 3d, 1833,
2 Pa. L. Dig- 2564, unless the testator is prevented, "shall be signed by
him at the end thereof."
The learned court below has interpreted this
phrase to mean, shall be signed, after [in time] the whole will has been
written. Simpson's will was wholly written, save the date, after his signature had been put upon the paper. The court therefore has concluded
that the will, not complying with the law, is invalid. We are constrained
to accept this conclusion. An object of the"statute was evidently to require a full written expression of the testamentary intentions, and then
an adoption of this expression by a subscription of the testator's name.
In Stinson's Estate, 228 Pa. 475, Brown, J., remarks, "when it [the
will] is fully expressed, his [testator's] will is finished, and the end of it
is reached. It is there [and, he might have added, then] that his signature must appear as evidence that it is his will." Mitchell, C. J., observed, in Swires' Estate, 225 Pa., 188, "The end meant by this provision
is the logical end of the language used, which shows that the testamentary purpose has been fully expressed. The position of the signature with regard to the bottom or end of the page is only evidence on the
question whether the testator has completed the expression of his intention." Cf. also, Taylor's Estate, 230 Pa. 346.
No objection was made to the reception of parol evidence that the
signature preceded the writing of the testamentary portion of the docu-
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ment. We think it was admissible.
probate to the will must be
Affirmed.
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It follows that the decree refusing

SAMUEL SLOANE FOR USE, ETC., v. ADAM KELLOG.
Note Without Consideration in Hands of Insolvent-Assignment for Benefit of Creditors-Estoppel.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Sloane was desirous of making purchases in his business, and to satisfy the persons from whom he was buying, he obtained a promissory
note for $10,000 from Kellog, without consideration, promising not to endorse it away. The note remained in his possession for eleven (11)
months, when becoming insolvent he made an assignment for the benefit
of his creditors. The assignee, finding this note among the papers of
Sloane, brings an action of assumpsit upon it. The persons, who were
induced to make the sales to Sloane, by the fact that he had Kellog's
note, have been paid.
Hollister for Plaintiff.
McCall ifor Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
O'HARA, J.-The facts as set forth present a very interesting case.
The assignee of Sloane finds the note in questibn and it is sued upon.
The defence set up is the lack of a sufficient consideration.
13 Pa. 416 holds that "All collateral securities pass to an assignee
even though they are not known to be in existence by the assignee".
46 L. R. A. 753 holds that a holder of a note if it is taken in the regular
course of business may collect and use it. In view of these decisions
the court is of the opinion that the note is properly sued upon.
The whole case therefore rests upon the matter of consideration.
Woods v. Smith, 92 Pa. 279, holds that one who conferred upon
another by a written agreement all the indicia of ownership of property
is estopped to assert title to it as against a third person who has purchased it for value in good faith from apparent owner. This doctrine of
estoppal is a well known general rule and while not on all fours with the
case at bar is I believe, flexible enough to apply to it.
The maker of this note allowed it to remain in the hands of a person
not owner even after its purpose was well served and while in these
hands it passed through due form to a person or persons who had in the
past given credit to the holder and this seems to me to be sufficient value
to be considered a purchase.
In view of these decision and statements of general rules the Court
feels justified in considering the defence of no consideration, not sufficient
to bar the action and must render judgment for the plaintiff.
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OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.

The general rule is that an assignee for the benefit of creditors succeeds only to the rights of the assignor, and takes the property subject
to all the equities to which it was liable in the hands of the assignor.
4 Cyc. 219; Pierce v. McKeehan, 3 Pa. 136; Luckenbach v. Brickenstuan,
5 W. & S. 145; Ayer's Estate, 5 Pa. Co. Ct. 540; Swoyer's Ap., 5 Pa.
3
The counsel for the plaintiff and the learned court below do not deny
the existence of this principle, but assert that it has no aptlication to
the facts of the present case, and, to justify a judgment for the plaintiff,
rely upon a doctrine of estoppel.
We have been unable to discover the requisite of an estoppel in the
facts of the present case. An essential element of an estoppel is that
the person invoking it should have been influenced by and relied upon
the representation or conduct of the party sought to be estopped. Perkiomen Brick Co. v. Dyer, 187 Pa. 470; Comegys v. Russell, 175 Pa. 166;
Erfert v. Russell, 172 Pa. 356; Wessels v. Weiss, 156 Pa. 591.
In the present case the assignee represents no creditor who gave the
debtor credit in reliance upon his ownership of the note of the defendant.
The creditors who sold to Kellog "on the strength of this note" have all
been paid. There is, therefore, no estoppel and no reason why Kellog's
property should be taken for the payment of Sloane's debts.
It is true that it has been held that one who voluntarily gives his
note to a bank for the purpose of taking up another's obligation and
being exhibited as one of its assets to the bank examiner, is estopped to
deny want of consideration upon the insolvency of the bank when the receiver brings an action upon the note for the benefit of the creditors of
the bank. Lyons v. Benney, 280 Pa. 117. This case is, however, readily
distinguishable from the case at bar. The fact that banks are frequently
examined by government officials and are closed if found by these officers
to be financially unsound is one of the principal sources of the bank's
credit. One whose act deceives the bank examiner deceives the people
who deal with the bank upon the faith of its efficient supervision by the
government, and it does no great violence to well established principles
to hold that such a person is estopped to deny his liability to the creditors of the bank.
Judgment reversed.

JOHN HARMON v. RAILWAY COMPANY.
Measure of Damages for Personal Injuries Resulting from the
Negligence of Railroad Future Suffering as an Element.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Harmon was injured while crossing the railroad tracks and brought
trespass. The court instructed the jury that it might allow him compensation for the pecuniary loss arising from the loss of his earning power
and in doing so they should make no allowance to the defendant for the
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fact that the injury had shortened his life. The court said that apart
from all lessening of earning power the plaintiff should be compensated
for the pain he had already suffered and for the pain he would still suffer,
but that only the present worth of the sum that would be compensation
for the future pain at the time of enduring it could be allowed. Verdict
for $3,000. Defendant moves for new trial.
Dickson for Plaintiff.
Fritz for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT,
CONWAY, J.-This is a motion for a new trial. The action is for
damages for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff while crossing the
railroad of the defendant. The only assignment of error before us, is in
reference to the charge of the court as to the measure of damages.
Defendant contends that the court erred in charging that the jury
might allow him compensation for the pecuniary loss arising from the
reduction of his earning power and that in doing so they should make no
allowance for the fact that the injury had shortened his life-that apart
from all lessening of earning power the plaintiff should be compensated
for the pain he had already suffered and for the pain he would still suffer
but that only the present worth of the sum that would be compensation
for the future pain at the time of enduring it could be allowed.
In estimating damages for personal injuries, the jury may consider
(1st) the expense to which the injured person is subjected by reason of
the injury complained of; (2nd) the inconvenience and suffering resulting
from it; (3rd) the loss of earning power, if any, whether temporary or
permanent, consequent upon the character of the injury. Goodhart vPenna. R. Co., 177 Pa.
The instruction of the court in charging the jury that in allowing
compensation for the pecuniary loss arising from the reduction of his
earning power and in doing so they should make no allowance for the fact
that the injury had shortened his life is a correct interpretation of the
law.
As to the charge of the court in respect to the measure of damages
for the pain and suffering endured and likely to be endured as a result of
the injuries.
The injured party is entitled to compensation for the pain and suffering that will naturally follow as a result of the injuries. But compensation only. Nothing more is contemplated. Green v. Brooks, 215 Pa.
492; Collins v. Leafy, 124 Pa. 203.
It is the duty of the court to lay down for the guidance of the
jury in the most explicit terms the limitations of their verdict to
compensation and compensation alone. Collins v. Leafy, supra. The
idea of a price as a measure of compensation for pain and suffering
is not applicable. The jury should not be lead to believe that they could
determine for what sum a person might be induced to subject himself to
the pain and suffering of the plaintiff and use this as a basis in determining what the compensation should be. The jury should be instructed that all they can allow the injured man is compensation, because
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of the fact that he must be subjected to pain for some time by reason of
the injury. They should also be instructed that in making this allowance they should not find that it would be worth say $100 per year and
then find that the injured party's expectancy in life was (30) thirty years,
and then multiply $100 by 30 and find $3,000 as the allowance.
They should be so instructed that they would find what sum they
would allow plaintiff (at time of rendering their verdict) for the pain and
suffering that he might- endure, taking into consideration his age, state
of health, business, habits and manner of living. McHugh v. Slosser,
159 Pa. 480; Baker v. Penna. Co., 142 Pa. 503; Glembrunner v. Pgh. Ry.
Co., 146 Pa. 504.
Because in allowing compensation for the loss of earning power they
considered the probable duration of his life, independent of his injury.
That is they may have found that if he had not suffered the injury he
would have lived for 30 years and earned a certain sum per year, hence
he should be allowed a certain sum as compensation for the loss.per year
that will follow as a result of the injury. Manifestly they could not then
say your life has been shortened five years and we will also compensate
you for this loss although we have allowed you for the loss of earning
power in those five years.
We are of the opinion that the charge of the court was inadequate in
that it did not clearly set forth the measure of damages for pain and
suffering which the plaintiff would likely suffer as a result of the injury.
It left it to the speculation of the jury, as to this element of damages.
Goodheart v. Penna. R. Co, 171 Pa. 1; McClane v. Pgh. R. Co., 230 Pa.
34.
We think this case is ruled by McClane v. Pittsburg Ry. Co., 230
Pa. 34.
While it is true that the instruction in the case at bar is somewhat
fuller yet we think that there was not such a full and clear setting forth
by the trial judge as to the proper measure of damages.
A new trial is therefore granted.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The counsel for the defendant claims that the case at bar may be
distinguished from McLane v. Pittsburg Ry. Co., 230, Pa. 29, by reason
of the fact that the instruction in the latter case designated "the present worth of the pain likely to be suffered in the futnre" as the measure
of the damage for future pain, whereas in the present case the court
designated "the present worth of the sum that would be compensation
for the future pain, etc." The learned counsel claims that by the instruction in the present case the idea of compensation was presented to
the jury and the objection which was taken to the use of the words
"present worth" in the McLane case removed.
In this opinion we cannot concur. In the McLane case the court had
also instructed the jury "that the compensation to be allowed for pain
and suffering must be its present worth for whatever is allowed for future loss is payable now." In regard to this instruction the court said,
"The rule is correctly enough stated, but without full instruction as to
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the method of its application, it would in the case of the ordinary jury,
be assuming a good deal to conclude that the law had been intelligently
and correctly applied."
These remarks are applicable to the instructions in the present case.
The jury should have been told what was meant by the expression
"present worth."
TQ assume that in the case of an ordinary jury these words would be
understood to mean "the sum of m6ney which if placed on interest
would at the time the 'pain was suffered equal the amount due as compensation for the pain suffered at that time," would flatter the jury but
contradict the testimony of the general experience of all those who have
had an opportunity to examine the mental accoutrements of the average

jury.
Judgment affirmed.

AMOS HINKLE v. MERCHANTS BANK.
Liability of Bank to Depositor.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Hinkle was for years a depositor in the bank. On August third
nineteen hundred and three his book was settled. The settlement showed that his credit amounted to $41,320 and the payments on his checks
to $41,300. The balance of $20.00 was carried to a later page of his book
and several settlements were subsequently made. In Sept. 1910 he discovered an error in the first settlement consisting of an erroneous drawing on his account with a check for $4,000 which was in fact only $2,000.
In March 1911, after demanding that the bank give him credit for an additional $2,000, he brings assumpsit to recover the amount. The statute
of limitations is offered.
Gearhardt for Plaintiff.
McKinney for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
MISS LONG, J. -This suit is brought by the depositor, Hinkle, to recover from the Merchants Bank$2.000which he depositedthere and which
had erroneously been drawn out with a check of $4,000 which was in fact
only $2,000. Hinkle's book was settled August 3rd, 1903, which settlement
showed a credit of $41,320 and payments on checks $41,300. The remaining $20.00 credit was carried to a later page, and several settlements
were subsequently made. Not until September 1910 did Hinkle discover
that the $2,000 check which he had issued had been changed to $4,000. A
period of seven years and one month had elapsed during which he could
have made this discovery. In this the depositor, Hinkle, exhibited gross
negligence.
In Phoenix Bank v. Risley, 111 U. S.125, it was held that the relation of a bank and its depositor is one simply of debtor and creditor and
that the depositor is not chargeable with any payments except such as
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are made in conformity with his orders. This case does not take into
consideration any element of negligence on the part of either party.
In this c ass of cases there must be taken into consideration negligence on the part of either party, the bank or the depositor.
Mackintosh v. Eliot National Bank, 123 Mass. 393, holds that where
blank checks were accessible to the clerk of the depositor, and the clerk
forged one of them, and the bank had no knowledge of any authority of
the clerk to place on the check the depositor's name, the bank, in cashing the check, was not exempt from liability.
However, in the case at bar, it does not appear that the mistake was
due to any negligence on the part of the bank.
The object of banks in giving to their depositors pass-books, is to inform the depositors from time to time of the condition of their accounts,
as they appear upon the books of the bank.
If there is no negligence, nor failure of the officers of the bank to
exercise due and reasonable care in detecting forgery or fraud, then
after a settlement is made and the pass-book is submitted to the depositor, and he is negligent, failing to perform his duty in examining his
pass-book and vouchers, with reasonable care, and report to the bank in
a reasonable time, any errors or mistakes, of the bank, he has no right
of action.
It was contended that the statute of limitations barred the right of
recovery. Though there was a lapse of time of seven years and one
month it does not follow that any right of recovery has been barred by
the statute of limitations. Where a fraudulent receipt of money is concealed from a creditor, the statute does not begin to run against the
creditor until he receives such knowledge. It was so held in Wickersham v. Lee, 83 Penna. 416. The depositor, Hinkle, was at fault in not
discovering the mistake at an earlier date, but it is not the statute of
limitations which prevents a recovery.
The reason for placing the liability on the depositor in all such cases
is the failure on his part to make examination of his pass-book, with
reasonable care and to make his report to the bank within a reasonable
time.
After making the discovery, it was the duty of Hinkle to report the
mistake to the bank without delay. In this, also, he failed, in allowing
six months to elapse before he demanded credit for the $2,000.
In Leather Manfacturer's Bank v. Morgan and others, 171 U. S. 96,
it was held that a depositor in a bank, who, having had his pass-book
written up receives it back with entries of credits and debits and his
paid checks as vouchers is bound personally, or by an authorized agent
to examine the pass book and vouchers, and report to the bank without
unreasonable delay, any errors which may be discovered in them and if
he fails to do so, and if the bank is thereby misled to its prejudice, he
cannot afterwards dispute the correctness of the balance shown by the
pass-book.
Chief Justice Sterrett said in his opinion in Jacob Myers v. The
South-western National Bank, that it cannot be doubted that as between
the bank and the plaintiff, the latter alone should be held responsible for
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the consequences resulting from the failure to examine the checks and
approve or reject them within a reasonable time.
In United Security Life Insurance and Trust Co. of Penna. v. Central National Bank of Phila., 185 Pa. 587, it was held that a bank book
settled, balance struck, and checks returned to the depositor will become
an account stated if not promptly examined and errors of amount pointed
out with correction.
Also, DeFrees Critten v. The Chemical National Bank, 171 N. Y.
219, held that a bank depositor owes to the bank the duty of exercising
reasonable care to verify returned vouchers by the record kept by him
of the checks he has issued for the purpose .of detecting forgeties or alterations.
The cases explicitly stating this doctrine are all in accord upon this
point. It follows that the plaintiff's demand for credit for $2000 must be
refused and judgment be rendered in favor of the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
The bank is authorized to pay out the moneys of its depositors upon
his genuine, not his forged., checks. Hinkle issued a check for $2000.
The bank claimed credit for paying upon the check $4000. It does not
appear that the check had been altered by the holder, nor even that the
bank in fact paid out more thon $2000 upon it. Having presented to it a
check for $2000, and paying that sum upon it, the bank erroneously claims
a credit, against Hinkle, of $4000. Can it retain the $2000 of the depositor, which it still has?
The settlement of 1903, would, had it been duly examined by Hinkle,
have revealed to him the over-charge. He did not, however, discover that
overcharge until 1910, and after several intervening settlements. Does
his delay in making the discovery estop him from claiming his money?
We think not. This is not the case in which the bank has paid out the
money, on a forged check, or on a genuine check, the amount named in
which has been misread by the bank teller or cashier. So far as appears,
not more than $2000 has been paid out by it. Hinkle's delay, therefore,
in making the discovery, has caused no loss, can have caused no loss, to
the bank. The doctrine of McNeely Co. v. Bank of N. America, 221 Pa.
588, and of cases cited in 14 Dickinson Law Review, 185 et seq., that a
prompt examination of the pass-book and of the returned checks is incumbent on the depositor, in order that the bank may be protected from
loss if it has made erroneous payments, is inapplicable.
It is said that the return of the checks with the balanced pass-book
is, if objection concerning error is not made in a reasonable time, an account stated. So it is, but we cannot admit that it is beyond correction
when error is clearly shown, and when correction can only result in compelling the bank to pay money of the depositor w.ich it still retains.
Compare 1 P. & L. Dig. Decisions, column 30 et seq.
The only objection to a recovery by the plaintiff that remains to be
considered is that which is founded on the statute of limitations. The
bank is ordinarily not compellable to pay the depositor, until he makes a
demand for payment by check or otherwise. The statute of limitations
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begins to run with the making of that demand. Girard Bank v. Bank
of Penn Twp., 39 Pa. 92; Bank of Titusville v. Thompson, 44 Super. 200.
But, when a bank states the account, showing what the balance in its
hands is, a right of action at once exists without demand, for the funds
actually in the bank belonging to the depositor, in excess of those which
are admitted to be there. The settlement is a notice that the bank will
pay no more than it thus concedes to be due, the depositor, and demand
for the excess is dispensed with. Penn Bank's Estate, 152 Pa. 65. Bank
of Titusville v. Thompson, 44 Super. 200. In six years from the rendition of the account, the statute of limitations will bar an action.
By a different path from that pursued by the learned court below,
we reach the same result. The plaintiff cannot recover. Affirmed.

JOHN TURFORD v. AMOS MURRAY AND CHAS.
READING.
Whether Employe is Partner.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Reading had been carrying on a business several years when he applied to Murray for a loan of $10,000. Murray agreed to loan that sum
if besides paying five per cent per year on it, Reading would give him
one third of the net annual profits. This after demur, Reading orally
agreed to do. The loan was made in 1907 and the interest was paid annually until 19i0. In 1907 Reading employed Turford as a salesman
at a salary of $1,200 per year. On account of this salary $1,800 is still
due. This is an action of assumpsit for that amount. Murray received
one third of the net profits of the business for the first year, but has received nothing in profits since.
Van Blarcom for Plaintiff.
Cohen for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
HOCH, J-In view of the fact that this action has been brought
against both Murray, the person loaning the money, and Reading, the
borrower, the question arises as to whether or not they can be considered
partners in respect to third persons. If it can be proven from the statement of facts that they constitute a partnership, liable as to third persons, then the plaintiff must prevail. To form an accurate, comprehensive and exclusive definition of partnership is almost impossible;
and in order to thoroughly understand the nature of a partnership, as
constituted under Pennsylvania law, a review of the early English rule
by way of a comparison with the present law in Pennsylvania will
probably aid us in elucidating this question.
It is noticeable that the old English rule, regarding partnership liability as to third persons, has been followed exactly in Pennsylvania.
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Here we have a case where a person loans money to another with the
condition that he is to obtain, as a compensation, in addition to a five per
cent per annum interest, one third of the net annual profits. The rule
governing these cases was laid down in Waugh v. Carver, 2 H. Bl. 239,
decided in 1793, and in Groce v. Smith, 2 Wm.Bl. 998, decided in 1775,
in which was the principle, that "Every man who has a share of the
profits of a trade, ought also to bear his share of the loss; and if any one
take part of the profits, he takes part of that fund on which the creditor
of the trader relies for his payment. "That he who takes a moiety of
of all the profits indefinitely, -shall, by operation of law, be made liable
to losses, if losses arise; upon the principle that by taking a part of the
profits, he takes from the creditors a part of that fund which is the
proper security to them for the payment of their debts." This principle
was followed in England until the year 1860. The manner of reasoning
was strictly followed and adopted in this state in Purviance v. McClintee,
6 S. & R. 259, decided in 1820, in which Chief Justice Tilghman said:
"It is impossible to know the secret agreements of merchants. Every
man, who trusts the partnership, increases this fund upon faith of its being applied in the first instance to pay partnership debts; and, therefore,
no man shall be suffered to diminish it, under the pretense of taking part
of the profits as a compensation for his services, without being himself
responsible in case of loss." There is no doubt but that the rule was
early settled in Pennsylvania that b participant in profits directly as such,
no matter what may have been the arrangements between the parties,
was, as to third parties, a partner. Gill v. Kuhn, 6 S. & R. 337; Churchman v. Smith, 6 Whart. 148.
The well established principle, as laid down in Groce v. Smith, was
abrogated, in England, in the great case of Cox v. Hickman, 8 H. L. C.
268, decided in year 1860, in which it was stated "that the agreement and
intention of the parties themselves should govern all cases. If they intended a partnership in the capital stock, or in the profits, or in both,
then the same rule should apply in favor of third persons, even if the
agreement were unknown to them; if no partnership was intended between the parties, then there should be none as to third persons, unless
they should hold themselves out as partners.," The courts of Pennsylvania, however, have not abrogated the old English rule and have in no
instance exactly followed the new rule as laid down in Cox v. Hickman.
The only modification of the old English rule was made by statute in 1870.
In Edwards v. Tracy, 62 Pa. 374, decided in 1869, Judge Sharswood
alluded to the new English rule in Cox v. Hickman, but adhered to the
old rule, as laid down in Waugh v. Carver, saying: "Partnership in
profits is not conclusive proof of the existence of the partnership relations,
but in England and in this country it is cogent evidence upon the question. It puts the defendant upon his proofs explanatory of the fact."
"A distinction," he says, "which, it must be admitted, is of a very refined and shadowy character, has been authoritively established both here
and there, that while the right to share in the profits may constitute a
partner, a commission equal to such a share as a compensation for ser-
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vices, does not. That this exception to the general rule is founded upon
a distinction without any difference has been generally conceded" and
well argued in Bullen v. Sharp. He further states that "It is entirely
too late now to question either the rule or the exception. We are bound
to stand super antiquas vias by our own decided cases." Lord v. Procter. 7 Phila. 630, 1869, states "that the rule in Waugh v. Carver is too
ancient a landmark in our law to be now disturbed."
And a very strong
case to support the above rule is Weiss v. Weiss, 166 Pa. 490, decided
in 1895, in which there is a thorough review as to the true test. This
doctrine is reaffirmed in Caldwell v. Miller, 127 Pa. 442; Walker v. Tup-'
per, 152 Pa. 1; In re Gibbs Estate, 157 Pa. 59.
Exceptions to the old English rule, however, gradually crept into the
law. Vol. III, of Kent's Commentaries, 25, note b, says: "The test of
partnership is a community of profits; a specific interest in the profits as
profits, in contradistinction to a stipulated portion of the profits as a compensation for services."
This test is reaffirmed in Liggett v. Hale, 58
N. Y. 272, and in 115 N. Y, 625, in which it is stated that "one who is
interested in the profits of a business as profits, and not as a means of
compensation for services, is a partner as to third persons, and is liable
as such for the debts."
Merrall v. Dobbins, 169 Pa. 480, 1895, applies the test of intention
and is a slight deviation from the old English rule. It holds that "the
agreement is our only guide. If it is evidence of the intention of the
parties to become joint owners of the business to be carried on, we need
not consider whether they become partners against their will by operation of law. We are not concerned with the question whether the law of
the siate by which its contract is governed is in harmony with the old
English rule of Groce v. Smith . . . . and the whole transaction is
to be taken into consideration in order to determine whether the relation
of partners was to be created. This agreement was held to be a partnership between Dobbins and Griffin because of the intention expressed that
Dobbins was liable for debts contracted by Griffin, in the conduct of the
business, as to third parties. " Irvin v. Bidwell, 72 Pa. 244. This test has
been followed very closely by Storey on Partnership, paragraphs 1, 36, 38,
49. In fact, there is a combination of the doctrine of Cox v. Hickman, and
the doctrine of principal and agent, in these sections by Storey. But in
176 Pa, 354, the "refined and shadowy distinction" (referred to above)
is adhered to, and the general rule is modified to the extent that "one
who receives a compensation or consideration merely, measured by a
proportion of the profits, is not a partner."
In reality the only departure from the old English rule in this state
has been by legislation. The act of April 6, 1870, provides that a loan to
an individual or a firm, upon an agreement to receive a share of the
profits of the business as a compensation for the use of the money and in
lieu of interest, shall not make the party, loaning the money liable as a
partner, except as to the money loaned, provided that the agreement for
loan shall be in writing, and that the party shall not hold himself
out as a general partner. The case in hand, therefore, does not come
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within this statute in that the agreement was oral, and the profits were
not to be in lieu of interest.
Counsel for defendant lays stress on Hart v. Kelley, 83 Pa. 286, but
that case is distinguished from the one in hand in that the question, whether
the agreement between the defendants made them partners as to third
parties, did not arise. Had the agreement not been rescinded immediately, it would have come under the Act of April 9, 1870.
The doctrine generally followed in most of the states seems to be
that a participation in the profits of a business, though cogent evidence
of a partnership, is not necessarily decisive of the question. Evidence
must show that the person taking the profits, shared them as principals
in a joint business; and that the intention of the parties must govern.
Harvey v. Childs, 45 Ohio 319; Cox v. Hickman, 8 H. of L. 268; Bullen v.
Sharp, 1 Law Rep. 112; Eastman v. Clark, 53 N. H. 276; Bucher v. Bush,
45 Mich. 188; Polk v. Buckman, 5 Sneed (Tenn.) 721; Storey on Partnership, sections 1, 36, 38, 49; 12 Conn. 69; Wild v. Durnford, 48 N. J. L. 129;
Meetan v. Valentine, 145 U. S. 611; Merrod v. Dobbins, 169 Pa. 480;
Clifton v. Howard, 80 Mo. 192; Clift v. Barrow, 108 N. Y. 187.
Therefore it must be conceded that the defendants at bar were doing
a partnership business and that the acts of one were the acts of both;
that each is agent for the firm; that each received part of the profits as
profits, and took part-of the fund to which the creditors of the partnership have a right to look for the payment of their debts, that both of
them are liable for contracts made by either of them, with third parties,
within the scope of the partnership business; and that an express stipulation between them to the effect that one should not be so liable, although it might be good between themselves, would be ineffectual as
against third parties. It seems, therefore, that the Pennsylvania courts
have an inclination to break away from the old English rule, but they
have not clearly expressed such an abrogation. We are not inclined to
depart from the doctrine by establishing an arbitrary rule by way of judicial legislation, even though the process of reasoning in some of the
Pennsylania cases is almost untenable.
The court is of the opinion that the relationship between Murray and
Reading was such as to constitute a partnership, and that judgment
should be entered against the defendant for $1800 and costs.
Judgment for plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
Until the decision of the celebrated case of Cox v. Hickman in 1860,
it was universally held that any sharing in the profits of a business subjected the party so sharing to a partner's liability so far as third persons
were concerned. Applying this dbctrine it Was held that one who received a share of the profits in lieu of a salary for services rendered, or
in lieu of interest on, or in 'payment of, money loaned, was liable as a
partner to third persons, irrespective of the actual intent of the parties
and of the fact that they were not partners interse.
The only reason ever assigned for this arbitrary rule was that if one
takes a part of the profits, he takes a part of the fund upon which the
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creditor of the trader relies for payment. The fallacy of this reasoning
has been pointed out by distinguished writers and courts. Lindley on
Partnership, 26; Bates on Partnership, 13; Boston Co. v. Smith, 13 R.
I. 31. Creditors do not look to the profits for theIr debts for the exististence of profits is inconsistent with the existence of debts.
The courts subsequently endeavored to escape the harshness of the
old rule by creating a subtle distinction between a payment out of the
profits and a payment varying with them.
Finally these subtle distinctions were almost universally swept away
and the whole law of partnership liability placed upon a sound basis.
The modern law of partnership dates from the decision by the House
of Lords of the celebrated case of Cox v. Hickman. In this case it was
decided that persons who share the profits of a business do not incur the
liabilities of partners, unless that business is carried on by themselves
personally or by others as their agents. This case was at once the end
of the old theory and the starting of a new doctrine. It put an end to
the notion that participation in the profits of a business is conclusive of
a partnership and placed partnership liability upon one or the other of
three well recognized grounds of liability at common law, to wit: personal
commission, agency or estoppel.
In Pennsylvania, however, we find a deliberate rejection of the doctrine of Cox v. Hickman and an adherence to the old rule on the principle
of stare decisis.
The inconvenience and injustice of the old rule is, it is true, partially
modified by certain statutory exceptions, but in cases not falling within
these statutory exceptions, profit-sharing is still the test of partnership
liability.
That the present case is not within the statutory exceptions and is
therefore governed by the old common law rule is sufficiently indicated
by Weiss v. Wessel's, 166 Pa. 490 which is on all fours with the case at
bar.
Judgment affirmed.

SAMUEL SOLARD v. JOHN TEAS.
Action by Patient for Unskillful and Negligent Professional

Treatment. Effect of Release of one Joint Tort-Feasor
Upon the Other.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Solard, being sick, called in Dr. Teas and Dr. Adam Farnham. They
unskillfully and negligently administered and Solard was kept ill a long
time in consequence. Solard sued Farnbam claiming $2,000 damages,
but, in consideration of Dr. Farnbam's comparative inexperience and
poverty, agreed to accept $250 from him and execute to him a release.
A special action for the same negligence and want of skill was simultaneously brought against Dr. Teas. In the trial of this action, Teas
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proved the identity of the cause of action against himself and Farnham
and the release of Farnham on receiving $250. The court allowed the
proof and told the jury that, the facts being as proved, the plaintiff
could not recover anything; that the release for $250 did not simply prevent a recovery of more than the amount of damages suffered minus
$250. Motion for a new trial.
Grim for Plaintiff.
Hoch for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
FLOMENHOFT, J.-The defendant in this case is being sued in a
special action for injuries alleged to have been committed while the defendant administered to the plaintiff. Another physician attended the
plaintiff at the same time.
The defense is, that a release executed by the plaintiff to the other
physician, releases the defendant. Judgment having been rendered for
the defendant, the plaintiff moves for a new trial.
It is well settled that a special action on the case is an action founded in contract. "There is a large number of cases in which the foundation of the action springs out of privity of contract between the parties,
but in which nevertheless the remedy for the non performance is indifferently either assumpsit or case upon tort." Burdick's Law of Torts p.
10 and cases there cited.
In the same book on pages 21 and 22, it is said "at present, neither
lack of precedent nor the fact that plaintiff may bring a contract action
is considered a serious obstacle to the maintenance of an action in tort."
It follows from these principles that the same rules must apply to
both forms of action as it would be unjust to allow another action where
there has been a satisfaction in one.
A release of one joint'debtor releases all. This is supported by the
case of Goldbeck A. Kensington National Bank, 147 Pa. 267. in which one
Schoening entered into a written agreement with the bank that it should
release a joint debtor or endorser on a promissory note, in consideration
of a partial payment on the note by Schoening; and it was held that "an
actual payment, made by one of the debtors, must enure to the benefit
of all of them, or otherwise the same debt might be recovered as many
times as there were debtors."
Where several persons act in concert in committing a negligent act
or where each one of several is negligent in failing to perform a common
duty, all are jointly and severally liable for the injury sustained. In a
suit by A, whose boat was detained in its navigation of the Schuylkill
River, against the City of Philadelphia, for drawing off water for other
than the domestic use of its citizens, thereby causing the said detention,
held, it was no defence that third parties claiming under the Schuylkill
River Navigation Company, contributed to the low stage of the water,
since they would be merely joint tort-feasors, any one of whom would be
liable for the whole injury. Gallagher v. Philadelphia, 4 Superior Ct. 60
(1887).
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Applying these principles to the case at bar, the defendant was sued
for the injury resulting from a joint obligation, and a release therefore
given to one joint tort-feasor released the other, the defendant in this
case.
The argument may be advanced that the rejected evidence if introduced would have shown that the defendant is wealthy and consequently
it was not intended to apply the release to him as it was given in consideration of the other physician's poverty. In the light of the case of
Goldbeck v. Kensington National Bank, supra. where a partial payment
released all of the joint debtors, this argument cannot prevail.
It may also be contended, that the mere fact, that an election, has
been made to sue in tort or contract, if defeated in the same, will
not prevent the bringing of the other alternate action. This has no application in the present case, as the election was made and plaintiff instead of being defeated in it, was satisfied to abandon the action for $250.
We, therefore, direct the motion for a new trial to be discharged.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
If A suffers damage from the joint acts of B and C, he may sue B,
or C, or both. He may collect compensation for the damage from B, and
omit to collect any from C. He may by execution or otherwise, collect
one-third, or one-half, or two-thirds of the compensation from B, and
then, by execution or otherwise, collect the other two-thirds, one-half or
one-third from C.
There may be good reasons for A's compelling B to pay all or most
of the damage, to the exoneration of C. C may be less guilty; be younger,
more inexperienced, have been influenced or controlled by B. It may be
that C is poor and B rich, so that C would be punished more severely
than B should he have to pay as much of the compensation as B. Will
any one say that the law should interpose and ordain that A shall treat
both tort-feasors alike?
That A actually sues B and C, does not deprive him of the right to
make a discrimination between them. He may cease to prosecute the
suit against C, and prosecute that against B. He may promise not to
prosecute that against C, he may put the promise into the form of a release. Why should this act preclude the subsequent recovery of anything
from B? The courts, however, began to say, a good while ago, that a
release of one co-debtor, co-tortfeasor, was a release of the other. Why?
One reason is "because his own deed shall be taken most strongly against
him." But his deed is a release of B. How is it taking this deed most
strongly against A to hold that it is a release of C? Is it taken as a cons
veyance of his lands to C? Is it taken as a release of other claim
against C? Why stop with saying that it is to be taken a release of C
from liability for this particular tort?
To take a deed most strongly against the grantor, is to select from
two or more permissible interpretations that which will be most advantageous to the grantee. But, how can a contract between A and B, be
tortured into a contract between A and C? How can a willingness and a
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will, to extinguish the liability of one of two debtors or wrongdoers, be
construed into a willingness or a will to extinguish that of the other?
Another reason assigned, in defence of the principle under consideration is "Such a release is a satisfaction in law, which is equal to a satisfaction in fact." But, it is not a satisfaction in law, unless the law
makes it such. • Our task is to find out why any body should make the
law that, where one who is entitled to obtain compensation from B and
C, waives the right as respects B, he waives it as respects C.
If B, after making satisfaction, would have a right to partial or
total reinbursement from C, and if the release of C would prevent B's
obtaining from him this partial or total reinbursement, the apodictic
phrase, "such arelease is a satisfaction in law" might have some signification. But, one joint tort-feasor has no right to reinbursement from
another, Turton v. Electric Co. 185 Pa. 406; Boyer v. Bolender, 129 Pa.
324. Hence, the release of one does not protect him from the necessity
of making contribution to the other. But, even if this right to contribution existed, somebody must have made the law, if law it be, that the
release of one precludes a successful suit of the other. Why was such a
law made? Who made it? Why is it slavishly followed?
Another reason sometimes assigned is, that, although the sufferer
from a tort may sue all the tort-feasors, and obtain judgment against
Seither v. Phila.
them, he cannot have more than one "satisfaction."
Traction Co., 125 Pa. 397. This, if possible, is more absurd than the
other explanations. A has suffercd from the joint acts of B and C. A
proper compensation would be $5,000. He thinks C less guilty than B,
poorer, under the undue influence of B. He knows that C would be
ruined, if he had.to pay $5,000 and that B, being rich, would scarcely
feelthe payment. If, out of pity, or magnanimity, he agrees to take $500
from C, we are to say that he gets "satisfaction"! He is satisfied to
take no more from C; he is not satisfied to take less than $4500 from B.
In what sense has he obtained "one satisfaction," when he gets $500 from
C? Is one-tenth of one satIsfaction "one satisfaction?" It is not the
compensation to which he has a right. Why arbitrarily say that he has
precluded himself from saying that it is not?
If the sufferer may issue execution and collect one-half from C,
without losing the right to issue another execution and to collect the
other half from B, why insist on interpreting, an agreement on receiving
one-half from C, not to press him farther, as an agreement not to
press the other? Cases distinguish between a release and an agreement not to sue, as if there really were a difference between them. A
release expresses the releasor's will that the obligation of the releasee
shall cease. But this obligation is not an obligation; i. e. ceases, when it
cannot be enforced. The binding agreement not to sue to enforce it, is
a binding agreement that it shall be extinct.
The only sensible discussion of the question that we have seen in the
reports of this state, we have found in Derosa v. Hamilton, 14 C. C. Rep.
307. In the other cases there is not the slightest effort to understand the
principle upon which the maxim in question rests. In Williamsv. LeBar,
141 Pa. 149, the maxim is stated and applied. In Peterson v. Wiggins,
230 Pa. 631, it is assumed to be law, without attempt at explanation or
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vindication, the writer of the opinion remarking that the party injured
may obtain "but one satisfaction."
We have said enough to indicate that in our opinion the principle that
a release of one joint tort-feaser is a release of the other, is insufferably
stupid and absurd. But until the process of rationalizing the law makes
greater headway than it has, we shall refrain from holding that the
learned court below has committed an error in adopting and applying it.
Affirmed.

OLCOTT v. MARSHALL.
Action for Damages-Impairment of Man's Earning PowerEvidence.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Olcott was run over by Marshall's automobile, being injured chiefly
thru Marshall's carelessness. At time of the accident Olcott was in business for himself conducting a store. At the trial of a suit for damages
for injuries sustained by Olcott, evidence was introddced to show that
Olcott has been injured to such an extent as to cause a loss of $3,000 a
year in his business. Defendant objected to the admission of the evidence. This is an appeal from court's ruling permitting the evidence to
be admitted.
Smith for Plaintiff.
Stafford for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
STEVENSON, J. The authority cited by the appellant is to be
found in 17 Cyc. pages 49 and 53. Upon reference thereto we find it under the head of "Evidence, II Damages, When Opinion is Rejected."
It does
The case stated merely says that "evidence was introduced."
Possibly the evidence was to be
not say that it is "opinion evidence."
found in his book accounts as showing a loss of profits, occasioned by the
necessity of his having to hire additional help or his inability to prosecute his business as formerly. We, therefore, deem it unnecessary to
decide this case upon the point of the admissibility of opinion evidence
of this nature. But nevertheless in Oliver v. Columbia N. & L. R. R.
Co., 43 S. E. 307, we find the court holding that an injured party may
testify as to his own estimate of the amount of his damages.
In 13 Cyc. 47 (Impairment of Earning Capacity), we find the following statement: "Under the general rule that a party injuring another by
a wrongful act is liable for all the direct injury consequent thereto, altho it may not have been contemplated as the probable result, the loss
or diminution of capacity to follow one's usual business or employment is
So again in McLaughlin v. City of
a proper subject of compensation."
Corry, 77 Pa. 109, where a plaintiff was injured thru the city's negligence, the court held that in estimating the measure of damages, his
actual permanent loss of earning power from the accident should be in-
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cluded. Thus we find the principle established that damages may be recovered for impairment of a man's earning capacity.
As to the introduction of evidence to show this impairment of earning capacity the authorities are many. In Nebraska City v. Campbell,
2 Black's U. S. Report 590, the court held that in an action for damages
for injuries, sustained by neglect of the city to keep a bridge in repair,
evidence showing the business in which plaintiff was engaged, its extent,
and the consequent loss arising to him from his inability to prosecute it,
is relevant and pertinent, as enabling the jury to fix, with some certainty,
the direct and necessary damages resulting from his injuries. In a case
cited in 33 N. J. Law Reports 434, the court said, "In actions founded
upon contract, evidence of loss of profits resulting from non-performance
has, in some instances, been rejected as too speculative and uncertain to
be made the means of arriving at compensation as the measure of damages. But in actions of tort, where quantum of damages is very much
within the discretion of the jury, evidence of the nature and extent of
plaintiff's business and the general rate of profit he has realized therefrom, which has been interrupted by defendant's wrorygful act, is properly received, not on the ground of its furnishing a measure of damages
to be adopted by the jury, but to be taken in consideration by the jury,
to guide them in the exercise of that discretion which, to a certain extent, is always vested in the jury." The doctrine as stated in this New
Jersey case is well settled. Wade v. Leroy, 20 How. 34; Ingram v. Lawson, 6 Bing. N. C. 212; Allison v. Chandler, 11 Mich. 543; Taylor v. Dustin, 43 N. H. 493; Somans v. Brown, 5 R. I. 299; Lincolnv. The Saratoga,
S. R. R. Co., 23 Wend. 425. In L. R. A. book 11, page 46, we find the following statement: "The loss or diminution of capacity to follow one's
usual business or employment, the rate of his earnings, and the extent
and nature of the business or employment of plaintiff, and his physical
capacity to perform his work at the time of injury, may be shown in fixing the damages. Alabama G. S. R. R. Co. v. Yarbough, 83 Ala. 238;
Walker v. Erie R. Co., 63 Barb. 260; Grant v. Brooklyn, 41 Barb. 381;
Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Hecht, 115 Ind. 443.
In estimating such damages the jury should take into consideration the
profession or business of plaintiff, and the effect of the permanent injuries upon his ability to comfortably pursue such profession or business.
Larmon v. Dist. of Columbia, 5 Cent. Rep. 447; 5 Mackey, 330. In
Wallace v. Pa. R. R. Co., 195 Pa. 127 it was held "profits derived from
capital invested in busiess cannot be considered as earnings, but in
many cases profits derived from the management of business may be properly considered as measuring the earning power. This is especially true
when the business is one which requires and receives the personal attention of the owner." In a still later case found in 230 Pa. 29, and decided
in year 1911, the Supreme Court said that in determining damages for the
loss of earning power from personal injuries, profits derived from the management of business may properly be considered as measuring the earning power.
In the present case Olcott doubtless carried on a business which required and received his personal attention, or otherwise we fail to see
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how personal injuries could affect his business in such a way. And, as
damages may be recovered for impairment of a man's earning power, we
fail to see how these damages could be properly determined by a jury
from whom is withheld evidence of the extent of his injury occasioned
by such incapacitation.
In the light of all the authorities cited, we, therefore conclude that
any evidence which tends to show the extent of plaintiff's business before and after his injuries or any diminution of profits resulting from his
being coerced to hire additional clerks or from his failure to give personal
attention to his orders or losses occasioned in a similar way, may properly
be introduced to be taken in consideration by the jury and allowed such
weight, as they, in the exercise of good sense and sound discretion,
.should think it entitled to. Judgment affirmed.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
At the time of his injury Olcott was in business, "conducting a
To conduct means to manage, to carry on (Century Dictionary).
store."
The management of a store involves the personal attention and labor of
the manager.
It has been held in many cases that even though the party injured
"was not employed at a fixed compensation but was conducting a business the extent and nature of it may be shown, not as affording a measure of damages, but to aid the jury in estimating a just compensation for
being prevented from engaging in or prosecuting such business." Sunderland on Damages, vol. 3, sec. 1246.
In Herr v. Warren Paving Co., Wis. 94, N. W. 789, it is said, "The
authorities are uniform to the effect that as a basis for the jury's estimation of damages, evidence may be given to show fully the capacity of
plaintiff to labor before his injury, and, if his work consisted in the
"It
management of a business, the character and magnitude thereof."
is competent to prove the magnitude of the profits therein-not that the
jury is to allow any loss of such profits as damages, but to consider them,
with other elements, as descriptive of the amount and grade of the serv"'When that is ascertainices of which the injured man was capable."
ed, the jurymen are to apply their judgment and common knowledge in
deciding what money-earning capacity results from the ability to render
Judgment affirmed.
such services."

JACKSON v. TEMPLE'S ADINISTRATORS.
Practice-Effect Upon Subsequent Purchasers of Failure to Revive Lien of Judgment-Who is a Bona Fide Purchaser
for Value.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Jackson obtained a judgment against Temple in 1898. Temple died
in 1905, the judgment never having been revived. Temple left one son
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as heir, who in 1910 conveyed the land inherited by him to Horace Talbot,
the present terre-tenant. The judgment with'its interest which has
never been paid, amounted to $7450, which was supposed to be the value
of the land. Talbot agreed to pay the judgment and the consideration
named in the deed was $1 and the payment of the judgment. Talbot defends the scifa to revive as terre-tenant on the ground that the judgment had lost its lien when he purchased.
Burd for Plaintiff.
Scott for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
MYERS, J.-Jackson obtained the judgment in question against
Temple in 1898 and Temple died seven years later. Temple's heirs
held the land until 1910, five years after the death of Temple. Altho the
judgment was never revived during these twelve years it remained a lien
indefinitely as against Temple and his heirs. 3 Trickett on Liens 293. In
1910 Temple's heir conveyed the land to Talbot. Talbot had notice of
this judgment and in the deed the consideration named was one dollar
($1) and Talbot's promise to satisfy the judgment against Temple. Talhot uow refuses to assume the debt, the amount of which with interest
is $7450 and which is supposed to be the value of the land. In defense
he says the judgment was not a lien against the land when he purchased.
Was the judgment a lien against the land when Talbot purchased it?
The Act of June 18, 1895, P. L. 197 provides as follows: "All judgments which at the time of the death of a decedent shall be a lien on his
real estate shall continue to bind such real estate during the term of five
years from his death, altho such judgment be not revived by scire facis
or otherwise after his death; and such judgments shall, during that term,
rank according to their priority at the time of such death and after the
expiration of such term, such judgment shall not continue a lien on the
real estate of such decedent as against a bonafide purchaser, mortgagee,
or other judgment creditor of such decedent, or of his heirs or devisees,
unless revived by scire facias or otherwise according to the laws regulating the revival of judgments."
If Talbot was a bonafide purchaser from Temple's heir, the land
would, by this statute, be freed of the lien of this judgment (assuming
that Temple was dead five years before this action was brought), and,
applying the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius," if Talbot
was not a bona fide purchaser the lien on the land remained. Talbot was
not a bona fide purchaser. "A bonafide purchaser is one who buys property without notice that another party is interested therein and pays a
full fair price for the same." Meyer v. Safe Dep. & Trust Co., 230 Pa.
106. Talbot not only knew that Jackson was interested in the land but
he paid only $1 therefore (aside from his promise to pay the judgment
which be now repudiates) when its value was $7450. Therefore he took
the land subject to the lien to which his vendor was subject; that is, to
this judgment.
We do not say how long the lien on the land will run without the
judgment being revived. But the act of 1849 which provides that as
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against a terre-tenant a judgment remains a lien on the land for five
years from the time he goes into possession or records his deed applies
only in case the judgment has been regularly revived between the original parties-which ithasnot in this case. Act of Apr. 16, 1849, P. L. 663.
However we believe the present case to be decided by the act of
June 18, 1895 and the authorities cited above. Accordingly a new trial
is granted.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
The lien of a judgment is of indefinite duration, until the land reaches
a bonafide purchaser for value, or until other liens upon it come into existence. The heir or devisee is not such purchaser. Temple's son was not
such purchaser. But temple's son has conveyed the land to Talbot. Talbot has not paid the purchase money, but he has bound himself to pay it.
He has "agreed to pay the judgment" of $7450. When a vendee gives
notes or bonds for the purchase money, or orally agrees to pay the purchase money, he is as much a purchaser for value as he becomes when he
actually pays it.
That the promise of Talbot imposed on him an obligation cannot be
doubted. He failing to perform, voluntarily, performance could be coerced
by the appropriate action, not perhaps by the judgment creditor, but by
the grantor. Lennox v. Brower, 160 Pa. 191; Blood v. Crew Levick Co., 171
Pa. 328, 338. The promise was to the grantor to pay the judgment creditor
the agreed price of the land. If it was not kept, the duty resulted to pay
it to the grantor. How then can it be said that Talbot is not a purchaser
for value?
Being a purchaser for value, how can he fail to be so far as the
judgment creditor is concerned, a bonafide purchaser? He used no deceit.
He intended, so far as appears, to do that which he promised to do, for,
from the fact that the judgment is not yet paid, cannot be inferred that he
did not intend to pay it, when he undertook to do so. His being a bona
fide purchaser depends, not on conduct or intention done or formed after
the purchase, but upon his conduct or intention at the time of purchasing.
It may be said that since Talbot agreed to pay the judgment creditor,
the latter should be allowed to revive the judgment and by means of the
revived judgment sell the land unless Talbot pays. The agreement, however, to pay the judgment is like any other agreement, to be enforced by a
suit issuing in a judgment based thereon.
The fact that the agreement is to pay a judgment, can have no effect on
the life, as a lien, of that judgment. The law furnishes means to prolong
the lien, an amicable or an adversary sci fa. It was said in Rudy's Appeal,
9 W. N. C. 308, presenting a question similar to the one before us, "The
most that can be said is that Hearing [read Talbot] may have made himself liable to an action on the part of the holder of the judgment. That
such a promise could galvanize into life this dead lien, so as to entitle it to
claim the proceeds of a sheriff's sale [read, so as to entitle it to be taken to
continue to be a lien and to have this lien perpetuated by a sci. fa.] is a
proposition exceedingly difficult to sustain."
The case of Meyer v. Trust Co., 230 Pa. 107 differs from this. The
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conveyance there, was to the grantee "subject" to all judgments and mortgages. No personal duty was assumed by the grantee to the owner of
them. Talbot promised to pay the purchase money to the judgment creditor. Despite the difference, we think that Wilhelmina Meyer, was a purchaser for value, for while she did not promise to pay the judgments, had
they been enforced against the personalty or other property of Henry
Meyer, she would have been bound to reimburse the sons and daughters.
Mays Estate, 218 Pa. 64; Blood v. Crew Levick Co., 171 Pa. 328; Moore's
Appeal, 88 Pa. 450; Thomas v. Willbank, 6 W. N. 477; Peters' Estate, 16
Super 462; Taylor v. Mayer, 93 Pa.42; Merrimanv. Moore, 90 Pa. 78. The
learned court below fails to take notice of this obligation assumed by
Wilhemina Meyer, and treats her as if the only consideration paid by her
was the one dollar, and concludes that, as in Lynch's Estate, 220 Pa. 14, she
was not a purchaser for value but a donee. Perhaps had its attention been
riveted upon the additional consideration, it would not have reached the
conclusion that Mrs. Meyer was not a purchaser for value but a mere
donee. The Supreme Court gives no evidence of any independent consideration.
The learned court below in Meyer v. Trust Co., remarks that "a bona
,Fde purchaser is one who buys property without notice that another party
is interested therein and pays a full and fair price for the same," a statement which needs emendation. It is not necessary that the price be "full,"
if "full" means equal to the mnarket value. It is not necessary that a purchaser of land from an owner against whom is a judgment, should buy in
ignorance of the judgment, in order to be entitled to claim that the judgment is, on account of its age without revival, no lien.
Judgment reversed.

